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An Examination of Western Representation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Through Various Media Outlets, Popular Literature and
How has Recent History and Outside Influences Affected the Viewpoint Presented to the Public? 
 
By Lynn Perkins 
Adviser: Mucahit Bilici 
 This research focuses on the Western media coverage of the rise to power of the Muslim 
Brotherhood which occurred after the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak in February of 
2011 as a result of the Egyptian Revolution. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s propaganda 
model that they established in their work Manufactured Consent is used to analyze the coverage 
used for this paper. After the propaganda model is xplained the research goes into the historical 
background over the past forty years that has influe ced the way Western media covers current 
events in the Middle East. Historical Events highlited are the Iranian revolution, the siege of 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca, The assignation of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, the marine 
barracks bombings in Beirut, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and lastly the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States. With the theories purposed by Chomsky and Herman and the historical 
background established, the examination of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood begins. This 
research shows that quite often history is altered in order to obtain the public support of the 
official stance of the Western powers, with the United States being the primary focus of this 
research. This public support is then used to justify whatever action or inaction taken by the West 
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On June 24, 2012 I had the good fortune of being in Tahrir Square, the heart of the Egyptian 
capital of Cairo. Two hours prior, Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had 
been announced as the first freely elected president of Egypt. This in spite having the difficult 
task of competing with Ahed Shafic, who had been the last Prime Minister under deposed leader 
Hosni Mubarak. Despite his ties to Mubarak, Egypt was deeply divided over the revolution and 
hesitant to install an Islamic party into power after years of mainly secular rule. Standing in the 
midst of jubilation there was still an air of uncertainty. An Egyptian reveler queried me if the 
United States would recognize the election of Morsi. Also, and more interestingly to me, he 
asked if the American people would accept an Egyptian government ruled by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
The tone of the revolution was set by the secular youths gathered in the square. The reality 
after the fall of Mubarak was that the Muslim Brother ood would be the only group with the 
organization and support to build a viable party for any national election. A long time ally to the 
United States was gone. Nonetheless the White House released the statement. ''We believe in the 
importance of the new Egyptian government upholding u iversal values, and respecting the 
rights of all Egyptian citizens -- including women a d religious minorities such as Coptic 
Christians.''1 Though the interim government during the bulk of the Egyptian revolution was 
controlled by the military council, the U.S. had kept its distance, as it was more comfortable with 
the council in power before the election to buy time for the secular movements to organize into 
viable political parties. Then a second call was made by the Obama administration to the 
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Egyptian Military Council on the day of the inauguration asking them to hand over power to 
ensure a peaceful and democratic transition.  
This inquiry in Tahrir Square leads one to contemplate what Americans knew about 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and how they came about this information. This also led me to 
question, what are the intentions behind the various f rms of media which people choose to stay 
informed on news? To investigate what the average Am rican might know of the Muslim 
Brotherhood I read articles from various national newspapers, respected online journals and 
watched multitudes of news specials and documentaris. When researching what the intentions 
were behind the message various media outlets were pr s nting I looked into the sources these 
outlets used such as academic journals produced by think tanks such as the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Middle East Forum. I also looked into the official United States Government 
responses to events and the reports given by corresp ndents on the ground in the Middle East. 
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman presented the theoretical framework I use to examine these 
outlets in their work, Manufacturing Consent. I will first present the framework of Chomsky’s 
critique of mass media and the outlines used to investigate any agenda’s behind their reporting. 
From there I will show the coverage of events in the Middle East over the last forty years, which 
has led to the current perspective used by the massedia outlets. Lastly I will go over the 
coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood by the American media outlets from the beginnings of the 
Egyptian Revolution until the election of Mohamed Morsi, who was a long standing member of 
the Brotherhood. 
Back to the question of how the American people would react to the Muslim Brotherhood 
winning the presidency and what their feelings were of the brotherhood. To address this must 
first examine how Americans receive news, and how that news is filtered and produced. Noam 
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Chomsky, a linguistic professor based at M.I.T., has become a forerunner in this study of media 
manipulation with his 1988 book Manufacturing Consent which was co-authored by Edward S. 
Herman. Chomsky and Herman propose that, in order to control public opinion, a predominant 
portion of news and editorial opinion in the United States and other leading Western nations is 
filtered through what they call the “Propaganda Model.” This propaganda model consists of five 
key contributors to the heavy influence that leading corporations, government and their 
bureaucracies have over the mass media. Before going into the filters in Chomsky’s propaganda 
model, let us review the definition of mass media th t he is using. 
“The mass media serve as a system of communicating messages and symbols to the 
general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate 
individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into 
the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and 
major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda.”2 
The first filter in the propaganda model is the size, ownership, and profit orientation of a 
media outlet. Given that the majority of mass media outlets are for-profit companies that are 
often owned by even larger corporate conglomerates that have a wide array of interests, with a 
prime example being the ownership of N.B.C. by General Electric, there is heavy pressure to 
maintain profit margins for these corporations. This combined with the high production costs 
further insures compliance with the economic and political interests of the larger ownership 
group. 
 The second filter is the advertising license to do business. While the majority of mass 
                                                        




media outlets revenue comes through advertising, others (P.B.S., N.P.R.) depend on private 
money from viewers and listeners and large government grants. One major exception would be 
the B.B.C. which receives major funds from the British parliament and advertising from abroad.   
This of course raises concerns that the B.B.C. is obligated to not only cater to outside advertising 
interests, but also that of the British government in order to maintain their funding. In both 
instances however, ultimately to cover the costs of pr duction and provide profits for the parent 
organization, major media organizations are often pr ssured to take steps that will not offend 
their advertisers and risk losing vital sources of revenue. 
 The third filter in the model is the sourcing of mass media news. Chomsky sites the New 
York Times’ long desire to be the authority on news in the United States and thus the writers of 
history. Many smaller markets do not have the operating budget of the larger national media 
outlets, and are forced to receive information second hand, many times reprinting the stories the 
larger market reports. Another cost effective way of obtaining information for the news reports 
comes from basing reporters in areas where information is readily available, such as the White 
House pressroom, or military press briefings during armed conflicts.  All of these equal a 
universal and controlled message to be spread throug out a multitude of channels. 
 The fourth filter is the flack and enforcers. This involves the pressure put on mass media 
outlets when a story strays from the approved messag  that appeals to the corporate and 
government’s interests. Pressure comes in a variety of methods such as direct public statements 
denying these stories, to the powerful think tanks that are set up by combinations of journalistic, 
business, academic and government individuals and organizations with a like-minded agenda, 
who actively work to discredit reporters or institutions that contradict their philosophy. 
 The fifth and last filter in the propaganda model has been replaced since the original 
 5 
publication of Manufacturing Consent. Anti- Communism is now Anti-Terrorism, with the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war. Communism and now terrorism are the tools of 
ingraining fear of “the other” in the minds of the populace. Without fear, the desire to fight or 
tolerate fighting to ensure American interests when they are challenged in far reaching parts of 
the world is difficult if not impossible to maintain. 
 Herman and Chomsky address the possible arguments against his propaganda model in 
their book and are also brought by the filmmakers in the subsequent documentary. The first being 
that a degree of control is needed to influence the public for the betterment of society and 
secondly that freedom of speech is alive and well and journalists are not filtered through a 
corporate and government filter. Chomsky declares th e points are outdated in the documentary 
Manufactured Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media. After the 17th century English 
Revolution criticizing the radical pro-democracy movements at the time stated “they have made 
the people thereby so curious and so arrogant that hey will never find humility enough to submit 
to civil rule,” further stating, “democracy is a game for the educated elites, not for the ignorant 
masses who have to be marginalized into submission. The common interests elude the general 
public.”3  Although manipulating facts to mold public opinio are dubious in any time period, the 
increasing of literacy in modern times and the advent of greater technologies to transmit 
information the instant it happens to any person who seeks it has potentially allowed the 
possibility of larger portions of the population to make informed decisions for the betterment of 
all without filters clouding the truth. In fact however, these filters have gone against the common 
interests of the general public, often favoring the int rests of the elites who control the process. 
 The other argument against Chomsky’s model is the journalistic community’s call for 
                                                        
3 Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing Consent - Noam Chomsky and the Media. YouTube. Directors: Mark Achbar, 
Peter Wintonick. New York: Zeitgeist Films, 1993.  
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freedom of speech and their claims of reporting stories that expose the wrongful actions of the 
government or large corporations. In response Chomsky and Herman state “We believe that what 
journalists do, what they see as newsworthy, and what they take for granted as premises of their 
work are frequently well explained by the incentives, pressures, and constraints incorporated into 
such a structural analysis.”4 Chomsky believes that there has always been a fringe portion of the 
media that is allowed to operate outside of the propaganda model to maintain the veil of free 
speech but also often marginalized and thus unheard in the wider community. 
 Chomsky and Herman’s model, which I will be using i  my examination of media, 
categorizes mass media in two overarching categories:  those that ask questions to contradict the 
message being put forth and secondly those that ask questions which fall in line with government 
and corporate agendas and this latter category can be divided into further subcategories; the 
liberal/Whig perspective and a conservative perspective. The former category, the questioning of 
policy and the desire to provide the full story of American actions and agendas to the general 
populace is often, as mentioned before, marginalized to the point of irrelevance.  It’s the two 
subdivisions of the last category that I would like to examine further both here and apply through 
the examination of articles throughout the piece.  
The first of the subdivisions, the moderate/Whig approach, or a high diplomatic approach, 
stresses progress and liberalism is inevitable. Going after what interferes with this natural 
progression and how to ensure the steady progress towards modernization is the ultimate focus of 
this viewpoint. Imposing Western ideals of what modernization should be is a primary fault in 
this school of approach. Drawing selectively from Western historical events to impose influence 
over perceptions of current and future events, theyconveniently deny or ignore other detrimental 
                                                        
4 Edward S Herman & Noam Chomsky. “Manufacturing Consent.” Pantheon Books, 2011-06-22. iBooks.  
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historical events that were perpetrated by the West. The desire to implement the “proven” 
democratic free market model of governance into the Middle East states and the call to better the 
status of the local population and states becoming positive and active members in the global 
world a chief characteristic of the platform of this philosophy, although we have seen many 
examples of the human rights aspect being ignored. The Council on Foreign Relations is the 
leading think-tank in this mode of thought and also publishes its own journal Foreign Affairs.  
The second of the subdivisions, the right wing, uses conservative philosophy to influence 
the controlled perceptions shaped through the media. This group is most guilty in what Edward 
Said characterized as “the malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable 
form of denigration of foreign culture in the West; What is said about the Muslim mind, or 
character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot ow be said in mainstream discussion about 
Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians.”5 A leading author in this conservative perception 
of the Middle East is Bernard Lewis. Lewis’ argument in an article entitled The Roots of Muslim 
Rage is that due to the lessons learned in the Western wo ld on the need for a secular 
government, the West is destined to be in conflict w th Islam, which is a religion that has the 
formations of state intertwined in its belief systems. Lewis sites a variety of historical examples 
to back up his claim that Islam is incapable of andu willing to end its centuries old conflict with 
the Western world, though his examples leave out much of the story in each incident. It began 
with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has virtually continued to the present day.6 
Lewis then provides a brief history of conflicts with West against the Muslim world, stating “The 
                                                        
5Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World 




6 Lewis, Bernard. The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic Monthly, Boston, Massachusetts Septemb r, 1990. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/ 
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French have left Algeria, the British have left Egypt, the Western oil companies have left their oil 
wells, the westernizing Shah has left Iran—yet the generalized resentment of the fundamentalists 
and other extremists against the West and its friends remains and grows and is not appeased.”7 
This leads the reader to believe that the Western powers have taken the necessary steps to 
appease the Muslim world and yet the Fundamentalist movement will continue to find fault and 
call for violence against the West. By labeling it as the West vs. Islam or against extremists it 
ignores and trivializes all other factors that have led to conflicts between Western powers and 
governments that have majority Muslim populations. Looking into all the examples you see two 
in the case of Algeria and Egypt where violent clashes were needed to push out the colonial 
powers of France and Britain.  The reclaiming of the oil fields from the West was a long hard 
fight that still has the West intervening in the region to ensure its thirst for oil is fulfilled, for 
example the U.S. intervention during the first Gulf War in order to protect a valuable oil supplier, 
Kuwait. And lastly, yes the Shah is gone, but he was propped up by the West, reinstalled as the 
Iranian supreme leader when the democratically elect d Mosaddeq moved to nationalize Iran oil. 
Soon after being reinstated, the Shah launched the White Revolution, which was proclaimed as a 
westernization program by the Shah, but was more a way to legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty by 
stripping powers from his chief rivals most notably the clergy and the landlords. Lastly, Lewis 
argues that it is the West that received an undue amount of anger, when the Soviet Union had 
also committed various crimes against the Middle East. Lewis seems to overlook the equally anti 
Soviet chants of “Godless Marxists.” that Khomeini proclaimed during the revolution.  
A leading work that articulates this perception would be the Clash of Civilizations by 
Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington’s main argument is, w th the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
                                                        
7 Lewis, Bernard. The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic Monthly, Boston, Massachusetts Septemb r, 1990. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/ 
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ending of the cold war, the new conflicts of the future will be cultural, between the prominent 
civilizations of the world. Huntington argues these conflicts have been around for much of world 
history, and the nationalist conflicts of the 19th and 20th century were only a temporary alteration 
of this historical track. As Huntington states “With the end of the Cold War, international politics 
moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece b omes the interaction between the West 
and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.”8  
Professor Juan Cole responds to this line of thought, stating: “But when you hear people 
talking about lumping all these issues together; when you hear them obliterating distinctions and 
using black-and-white rhetoric; when you hear them talk of existential threats, and above all 
when you see that they are convinced that small move ents that they hate are likely to have an 
immediate and revolutionary impact, then you should be afraid, be very afraid. That is when 
extremism learns to hate and turns to violence.”9  The neoconservative approach capitalizes on 
the use of fear to pursue its agenda. By ignoring the causes of events, this approach focuses on 
the drama of the events and simplifies the situation into ideas of pure good and evil. With no 
shortage of characters to vilify in the region, this approach usually calls for military action to 
ensure the interests of the West. “The white Man’s bourdon”10 of having to save the Middle 
Easterners from themselves was further justification for action, with the Bush doctrine as a prime 
example, which speculated that by introducing democracy into the region, it would spread like 
wild fire. The government established in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the 2006 
elections held in Palestine after heavy pressure from the United States are examples of the 
                                                        
8 Huntington, Sam. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs; Summer 1993; 72, 3; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 
22uel P 
9Cole, Juan. When Extremism Learns to Blow things Up Informed Comment THOUGHTS ON THE MIDDLE 
EAST, HISTORY AND RELIGION 07/24/2011 
http://www.juancole.com/2011/07/when-extremism-learns-to-blow-things-up.html 
10 A poem of the same name which was written by Rudyard Kipling which was highly critical of the U.S. 
imperialist actions regarding the Philippians and questioned the motivations behind theses aspirations. 
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doctrine put into action. Both examples have, in the long run, turned out to be failures for the US 
in varying degrees, with Hamas achieving victory in Palestine and Iraq still highly unstable, they 
are still both examples of direct US intervention by imposing Western ideals for the local 
populations. 
 As with many current examinations of the Middle East, my thesis takes its origins from 
the Arab Spring of 2011. Beginning January 25th, 2011, the Egyptian people began protesting 
the government of Hosni Mubarak after being inspired by a similar revolution in Tunisia. On 
February 11, after sustained mass protests, not only in Tahrir Square but also throughout Egypt, 
the vice president announced the handing of control over to the military council, less than three 
weeks after the revolution. 
With the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president of more than 30 years, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was thrust into the international spotlight. The moment Mubarak stepped 
down, speculation spread across Egypt and the world of the intentions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest and best organized opposition group. While at first maintaining that 
it would stay out of the elections, the Brotherhood quickly backed off this position and The 
Freedom and Justice Party was formed as the political party representing the interests of the 
Brotherhood. With a decisive win of the majority of the parliamentary seats and taking a narrow 
victory in the presidential elections, concerns over what Egypt would become under the Muslim 
Brotherhood rule were raised by outside observers such as if Islamic Law, or Shari’a, would 
become the rule of law in Egypt, that the treaty with Israel would be thrown out and that 
relations with the West would disincarnate. Of course, there is a broad spectrum of opinions on 
this issue, but more concerning is how these opinions are formed, and where the various media 
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outlets get their information and how this information is interpreted to suit the overall worldview 
of the media outlet doing the reporting. 
First, let’s examine the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East over the past forty 
years, which I argue is the period of time that most defines US attitudes towards the Middle East. 
This along with Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model will help us properly investigate the 
coverage of the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Islam as a whole by 
American and Western media outlets.        
  
 12
Covering the Decline of American Middle East Foreign Policy 
and the Rise of Islamization 
United States foreign policy in the Middle East since the end of World War II, is stated 
perfectly by Joel Hirst, in his article The Wrong Side of History “We claim to be the guarantors of 
freedom in the world, and yet we make our places in the beds of some of the world's most brutal 
tyrants. We claim to support freedom of religion and watch converts to Christianity executed. We 
claim to defend women's rights and sit idly by while women are stoned to death. We do this 
because we are afraid of the alternative.”11 The alternative he speaks of is the Islamic revolution 
that was envisioned and executed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Due to Iran’s anti-western rhetoric 
and desire eliminate American influence with its unbalanced economic ties, there was fear from 
the U.S. that other countries in the region would follow suit. As a result the United States would 
support leadership in countries that were clearly tyrannical and unjust towards their people but 
sympathetic towards U.S. interests and this became the standard procedure in US relations with 
its dwindling Middle East allies. 
 Throughout this next section I will show how common Western perceptions of the Middle 
East are intertwined with a slow decline in successful foreign policy over the last 40 years. The 
loss of key allies in the region, such as Iran before the 1979 revolution and the failure of bringing 
about any successful resolution concerning the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict are just two examples 
of Western foreign policy failures.  By maintaining an unflinching agenda that is accurately 
articulated by Mr. Hirst and that is shown repeatedly in the examples below, we have strayed 
from the principles that we hold ourselves to, and destroyed America’s reputation in a region 
                                                        
11Hirst, Joel D. “The Wrong Side of History” Huffington Post, January 28, 2011 
http://www.cfr.org/egypt/wrong-side-history/p23925 
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striving for answers of how to adapt to modernization, and even more fundamentally, how to set 
up a functioning state.  
Many of the modern Middle Eastern states have only recently achieved their 
independence from Western powers in the last 70 years, and before Western control, various 
empires had enjoyed control of the region for hundreds of years. The carving up of the modern 
Middle Eastern states was dictated by the European colonial powers after the fall of the 
Ottomans, and was done to meet the needs of the exiting colonial powers, and not for the good of 
the people in the region. National identities, as defined by Benedict Anderson as “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”12 Anderson states 
that nationalism came about as a result of the French revolution and the fall of the European 
monarchies. Nationalism did not emerge for many people f people and leaders in the region 
until the last years of the Ottoman Empire and in defiance of Western colonization, which 
occurred in much of the lands formally controlled by the Ottomans. When it became difficult for 
the Colonial powers to maintain direct control over their former Ottoman lands, they set up 
Western-modeled states that maintained the interests of the Western powers, such as the 
Francophile Maronite Christian dominated government in Lebanon, and the S ah in Iran after 
being placed back in power due to a coup d’état arrnged by the United States. The rise of 
political and extremist Islam is in reaction to thecontrol of the Western powers and the Western 
modeled states they left in their wake. The following events are key to Western perceptions 
towards current and future events in the Middle East and have profoundly affected Western 
attitudes towards Islam. 
The unpredictable outcomes of the Iranian Revolution are apparent in hindsight, but at 
the time these uncertainties also led to false assumptions of the Shah’s control of Iran in the latter 
                                                        
12 Anderson, Benedict. “Imagined Communities.” Verso, 2011-02-01. iBooks 
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stages of the revolution.  Since the 1953 coup d’état that ousted the populist Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh and reinstated Reza Shah to power the media in the United States 
maintained favorable headlines on the Shah which helped justify the aid coming from the United 
States and vaulting the Shah into the position of the United States chief ally in the Middle East. 
Headlines run in the months after the Shah returned to power declared “New Regime in Iran 
Opens War on Reds: Prince is Arrested” and “Iranian Red Doomed” showed Iran’s commitment 
to U.S. interests in the cold war with the Soviet Union.  Five years after the Mosaddegh incident, 
and after reports surfaced in Soviet Union publications, the Shah proclaimed to the world in a 
visit to London “In my country, I am proud to say, truly 99% of the people do not wish to change 
the way they are living.”13 
In an article published in 1975 for the New York Times on the changing culture of Iran, 
Eric Pace brings up the many positives of the rising oil prices on Iranian society. With the over 
$2 billion monthly revenues in oil Iran was earning Price tells us in his article that the Shah had 
planned to spend $80 billion in improvements such as schools and infrastructure projects.14 The 
only negatives in of this economic boom and westernization mentioned in Price’s article are the 
deterioration of Iranian cultural identity to western culture and technology. The piece ignores the 
income disparity caused by the oil revenues and how many of the westernization programs 
instituted by the Shah were not only to modernize Iran, but also to centralize power away from 
traditional power centers such as the clergy and the Bazaar.  
In the winter 1978 edition of Foreign Affairs, James Bill wrote a piece that for the most 
part praised the Shah and his leadership, and hardly questioned the Shah’s ability to regain 
                                                        
13 Shah of Iran denies possibility of a revolt against hi  regime The New,York Times. (1959, May 09) 
14 Pace, Eric. A changing Iran wonders whether the gain will exceed the loss. The New,York Times. (1975, Jan 16). 
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control of his country. First, he reaffirmed the Shah’s importance to the West, stating, “American 
opinion leaders have long admired the sturdy consistency with which Iran has maintained its 
orderly existence and is a reliable partner client sta e upon which to rest U.S. political and 
economic interests.”15 Bill goes further with his positive review of the Shah’s past leadership and 
how this would help him maintain his power and maintain stability. Though advising the Shah to 
move further towards democracy, never is it suggested that the Shah step down from power. The 
message of stability was a significant motivation in how events were reported by the Carter 
administration and publications friendly towards American leadership. The United States had 
already experienced how actions in the Middle East could directly affect them with the energy 
crisis of the early 1970’s which was a direct result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Middle 
East oil producing states boycott of the U.S. for its support of Israel. The thought of losing such a 
key partner in the region, and a crucial supplier of oil, was a scary thought, but in the beginnings 
of the revolution it was not Islam they believed would take power. The influence of the Soviet 
Union worried the U.S. policy makers and media the most. When the populist, anti-American 
slogans of Khomeini began to hit the airwaves in the West, such as “the United States is the head 
of the imperialist serpent” and accusing the international corporations of “looting Iran’s 
resources,”16 the Shah made a last grasp for more American support, labeling Khomeini and his 
followers Islamic-Socialism.  
 “The Shah left Iran, which he has ruled for 37 years. Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi 
termed his departure an extended vacation, but it is more likely to be a long and perhaps 
permanent exile. He left aboard a royal jet aircraft after a year of demonstrations and 
crippling strikes aimed at ousting him. The demonstrators denounced the arbitrary way in 
which he pressed his ambitious industrialization programs, corruption in ruling circles 
                                                        
15 Bill, James A. “Iran and the Crisis of ‘78” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), Pg. 323 
16 Rouleau, Eric Khmeini’s Iran, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Fall 1980) 
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and harsh measures used to suppress opposition from religious and liberal political 
groups.”17 
“Major newspapers such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Wall Street 
Journal have been especially weak in their reporting on Ira, misrepresenting the nature and 
depth of the opposition of the Shah.”18 The shock of the Shah falling was a devastating loss in 
American foreign policy, and further drastically affected American and Western people by 
causing a second energy crisis in a 10-year period. Fin ing fault for this was at top priority. 
“An overwhelming victory was declared by Ayatollah K omeini In the referendum 
proposing that Iran became an Islamic republic, and he announced that April 1st was the 
‘first day of a Government of God.’ Meanwhile, disturbances continued among ethnic 
minorities who want self-rule rather than a central Government.”19 
In an article entitled Khomeini’s Iran, Eric Rouleau was highly critical of past actions 
against Iran by the U.S. such as the 1953 coup d’état which the C.I.A. aided the Shah’s military 
in removing populist Prime Minister Mosaddegh who wished to nationalize the oil industry. This 
critique lay in sharp contrast to James Bill’s article published less than a year earlier. Rouleau’s 
piece went further on to criticize the domestic refo ms of the Shah, and showed how these failed 
domestic plans and the Shah’s close ties with the U.S. were given as justifiable reasons for the 
overthrow of the Shah. The piece focused on American mistakes in its earlier dealings with Iran, 
thereby relieving President Jimmy Carter of sole blame. 
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The roots of American perceptions of the Middle East and Islam are planted in the Iranian 
Revolution, also referred to as the Islamic Revoluti n. Although Islamic organizations had 
participated in politics before, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Islamic 
extremism had appeared with some factions of the PLO, the Iranian revolution represented the 
first success of Islam overthrowing a repressive autocrat, and using modern political ideas 
intertwined with Islamic history and philosophy. 
“The American Embassy in Teheran was seized by students who reportedly took as 
hostages 100 employees, mostly Americans. They vowed to occupy the building until the 
Shah, a cancer patient in a New York Hospital, was returned to Iran to face trial. The 
students were Moslems, and their occupation of the embassy was said to have the support 
of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.”20 
Just two years earlier Iran had been one of the United State’s closest allies. As a key 
component of the Nixon Doctrine, whose goal was to prevent U.S. policing of far-flung regions 
through the world, Iran was used in proxy to maintain stability in the Middle East. Iran’s willing 
and active participation in Nixon’s doctrine however further angered the left and the Shi’a clergy.  
The effect of the Iranian hostage crisis is the desired effect of extremist groups on both sides.  
Attack on the Grand Mosque of Mecca 
“An attack by fundamentalist Muslims believed to be from Iran was made on 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca, according to American officials. They said that the band 
had seized Islam's holiest shrine and fought off Saudi Arabian troops for several hours 
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before relinquishing control of the mosque. An unconfirmed report said that an Imam of 
Mecca, a Moslem leader, was killed in the crossfire. [AI: 4-5.]” 21 
 
 Given the events of the previous year in Iran, the hostage crisis and Khomeini's call for 
an Islamic Revolution to spread across the region, Ira  was quickly assumed to be responsible 
for events at the Grand Mosque. When news finally released by the Saudi Interior Minister 
Prince Nayef, stating that the occupiers were Sunni Islamic Fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia 
and had no connection to Iran or the United States, it was too late in terms of the Iranian and 
U.S. propaganda machines. The Ayatollah Khomeini wet on Tehran radio commenting on the 
seizure stating that; “It is not beyond guessing that is is the work of criminal American 
imperialism and international Zionism.”22 These accusations were refuted by then U.S. president 
Jimmy Carter saying that authorities would receive official protest for the “False and 
irresponsible charges.”23 Although the United States media began to downplay actual Iranian 
direct involvement in the Grand Mosque attack they b gan to play up Khomeini’s influence was 
having on the region. The popular news magazine Newsweek compared Khomeini to Mao Tse 
Tung, “both idea men who inspire others to put these ideas into action.”24 The statements by 
Khomeini blaming the U.S. and Israel caused widespread rioting over the Islamic world. U.S. 
Embassies in Pakistan and Libya were destroyed. The above Newsweek article called the burning 
of the U.S. embassy in Libya as the third example of American “imperialism” to fall. The 
destruction of the two embassies and the anti-American outcry across the Islamic world further 
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strengthen the belief in the cultural divide and conflict between the West and the Islamic 
world.  “It is the atmosphere of Fanaticism created by Khomeini that this possible”25 However, 
the fanaticism by Khomeini and its potential to Islamize the Middle East was not yet the chief 
motivation for the U.S. call to arms. The United States was more concerned how the uncertainty 
could affect the balance of power in the region with the Soviet Union.  American leaders and 
media were still intrenched in their Cold War mentality to pay much seriousness to the 
“Khomeini Contagion.” It was believed and hoped that is movement would die out and reports 
from the region often alluded that his power in Iran was fragmented at best. The uncertainty of 
how events would play out with the power vacuum left b hind by the Shah was still the chief 
concern of the United States. 
The real fear that the power vacuum presented American leadership was losing vital oil 
supplies. “On the basis of events that have already occurred, one must expect further disruptions 
of the world’s oil supply. A drop in the Iranian production and shipments seems certain, putting 
further upward pressure on the price of oil.”26 President Jimmy Carter established the Carter 
doctrine in his 1980 State of the Union Address that st ted any outside threat to the Persian Gulf 
would warrant retaliation from the United States in defense of their interests in the region. This 
cemented American intentions to use all of its resources to maintain control of the region. This 
was a direct response to the Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan which could potentially 
further disrupt United States oil supplies.27 President Carter’s uccessor Ronald Reagan 
reaffirmed that America would maintain a strong presence in the region in order to maintain its 
economic and security interests in the region. In an October 1st, 1981 statement Reagan “Vowed 
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that the United States would never permit Saudi Arabia ‘to be an Iran’”28 In the same New York 
Times article, Middle Eastern foreign correspondent Thomas Friedman argued that the threat of 
the Saudi family losing control of the country was minimal at most, the real threat to U.S. 
interests concerning Saudi Arabia was the Saudis changing direction in policy towards the 
United States. This is where the separation from the conservative and moderate perspectives 
begins to take its dramatic turn, by separating unrelated incidents occurring in Middle Eastern 
states that make decisions on what is best for theinational interests and not an overarching 
Khomeinist or Islamic fundamentalist agenda. Robin Wright, a contemporary journalist to 
Thomas Friedman, argued there must be a grand Islamic fundamentalist plan to gain control of 
the Middle East, and to cripple the West with the cutting off of oil supplies.29  
Assassination in Egypt 
“Egypt's President was assassinated by a group of men in uniform as he watched a 
military parade in Cairo. The assassins broke rank as the parade passed by and threw 
grenades and fired rifles at the reviewing stand, fatally wounding Anwar el-Sadat. Others 
in the crowded reviewing stand area were killed or w unded. The parade was 
commemorating Mr. Sadat's 1973 war against Israel. For the time being, Egypt's affairs 
are expected to be run by Vice President Hosni Mubarak, President Sadat's long-time 
associate. The Interim president for the next 80 days, pending elections, will be Sufi Abu 
Taleb, Speaker of Parliament.”30 
Anwar Sadat was highly regarded and lamented by the West. U.S. president Ronald 
Reagan said of Sadat, “In a world of hatred he was a man of hope.” French President, Francois 
                                                        
28 Friedman, Thomas L. Saudis, in Firm Control, Face Long-Term Dangers New York Times; October 18, 1981 
29 Wright, Robin Sacred Rage: The Wrath of militant Islam Simon & Schuster. New York, 1985. pg. 150 
30 News Summary: Assassination in Egypt International National Metropolitan New York Times (1923-Current file); 
Oct 7, 1981 
 21
Mitterrand stated, “The world has lost one of the best among us,” and U.N. Secretary General, 
Kurt Waldheim praised Sadat’s “courage of his convictions, his historical role and his dedication 
to his country.”31  Sadat’s Egypt was considered a pillar of peace32 in the more and more chaotic 
and violent Middle East due to its treaty with Israel. Reasoning for such an act of terror in the 
West was lacking; why would the “Islamists” want to kill such a leader who was working 
towards peace and prosperity for his country other t an to further propagate the chaos of the 
regime and hopefully destabilize the “soul” of the Arab world so as to have Egypt become the 
next Islamic Republic. It was precisely this high regard by the West that ultimately resulted in 
Sadat’s assassination. 
 “The young proselytizers did not consider the retrieval of the Sinai Peninsula, lost to 
Israel in the ’67 war sufficient reward for recognition of the Jewish state among other 
complaints”33 Among the other complaints to which Miss Wright refe s to is the lack of 
consideration given to the Palestinians in regards to the Peace Treaty Sadat made with Israel, 
notable as the first recognition of the state of Israel by an Arab country. Sadat’s high regard in the 
Middle East fell in spite of Egypt’s successful advnces made during the war with Israel in 1973. 
Egypt’s conclusion of the peace treaty resulted in its expulsion from the Arab League, which 
viewed Egypt’s participation as a betrayal of the Palestinian people. The involvement of the 
United States in the peace treaty with Israel further inflamed the Islamic militants of Egypt “In 
the eyes of the Militants, the defiantly proud Egyptians, who once ruled the Mediterranean 
(Historical inaccuracy) were becoming another satellite of the United States.” Given the history 
of Egypt for the previous 200 years since the invasion of Napoleon, the idea of another Western 
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power a having influence over Egyptian affairs was unacceptable to the majority of Egyptians, 
even with much-needed aid pouring in to the country. Further illustrating the ill reaction that the 
Arab world felt towards the Camp David Accords, The Guardian quoted Sadat’s former Chief of 
Staff to Sadat, Lt. Gen. Saedaden Shayli as saying that the “Egyptian forces should follow up on 
the assassination by wrestling power from leaders committed to ‘Zionism and imperialism.’”34 
Sadat’s ability to maintain his control over Egypt during this time of chaos in the Middle 
East was yet another reason for his popularity in the Western world. He had eased up on the 
crackdowns inflicted on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations early in his 
presidency in order to strengthen his power base and shifted the attack on the leftist and 
Nasserite movements throughout Egypt. In an article published in The Washington Post, Thomas 
Lippman points out the many policies enacted by Sadat nd the ways in which he tried and 
distance himself from the Nasser regime. Some of these changes were the expulsion of Soviet 
military advisors, the release of thousands of political prisoners and the renewed moral of 
Egyptians due to the success of the 1973 war with Israel.  Further policies mentioned in the piece 
that were enacted by Sadat to further solidify his stamp on the country were the liberalizing of 
the economy, restoring relations with the United States and traveling to Jerusalem to challenge 
the Israelis to peace talks.35  As his presidency continued, and despite his outwardly devotional 
actions towards Islam the secular tendencies in his government policies began the divide with the 
Islamic movements. The Sinai pact and then subsequent Camp David accords further agitated the 
various Islamic groups within Egypt. Despite a growing animosity from fellow Egyptians, Sadat 
continued to ignore “advisors” warnings against the Islamic movements stating “I am not the 
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Shah of Iran, and our Muslims are not Khomanists”36 Shortly before his assassination Sadat 
finally began to heed his advisors but this proved to be too late. In a piece written just after Sadat 
was assassinated, Peter Perl wrote a piece concernig the opinions of the members of an Islamic 
community center in Washington D.C. Ron Cathell of the center stated “though we certainly 
viewed him in a positive light, we recognize that Sdat is a very controversial figure. You will 
run into a lot of people who are pleased that Sadat is gone, he ruled in a very—uh, I don’t know 
how to characterize it—a very strong way.” Further an Egyptian tailor who resided in 
Washington stated, “I believe 60 percent of the Egyptian people here will celebrate that God 
takes him.”37 
Egyptian authorities initiated a brutal crackdown after Sadat was killed; asserting that it 
was not Sadat alone who was being targeted but the entire grandstand, alleging it was a failed 
coup d’état attempt. Authorities wanted to diffuse th larger Islamic movement that was the real 
culprit in the assassination and the primary opposition to the regime. In Eric Rouleau’s article, 
Who Killed Sadat?, he argues the approach being taken in their handling of the assassination and 
the crackdown they put in place in response to the Egyptian public and the world as overly 
aggressive. “The Egyptian authorities must minimize the plot as to diminish its political 
significance but at the same time they must exaggerate its scope to justify the extent of the 
repression.”38 This is an extreme example of tactics used in American media manipulation by 
maximizing fears and our duty to impose Western Liberal ideals and holding back the means   
After the assassination of Sadat the media coverage, as seen above, took on what 
Huntington would later call the “Clash of Civilizations.”  Sadat continued to be glorified as a 
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pillar of peace and a leader who was able to maintain control in an Egyptian state that was 
plagued with a poor economy and a rising unrest in his own population. With Sadat’s 
assassination by Islamic Militants within his military the United States perception of the Middle 
East shifted to one of instability, Josh Goshko wrote in his piece for the Washington post that the 
comparisons were to great at the time to that of fall o  the Shah in Iran, and the United States was 
forced to seriously reconsider its long standing policy evoked during the Nixon era of arming 
friendly leaders to the U.S. in the Middle East with weapons when they were so vulnerable to 
domestic violence.39 The tragic loss of yet another Middle Eastern leader so popular with 
Western populations, who seemed able to bridge the gap between the West and the Islamic world, 
cast Islam in the minds of Westerners as moving as a whole towards the extreme. 
Bombings in Beirut 
“At least 161 American marines and sailors were killed and 75 were injured when suicide 
terrorists driving a truck loaded with TNT blew up a Marine headquarters at Beirut 
International Airport. A Pentagon spokesman said the truck broke through a series of steel 
fences and sandbag barricades and exploded in the heart of the headquarters shortly 
before dawn. Two miles away, another bomb-laden truck crashed into a French barracks, 
killing at least 12 French paratroopers and wounding 13. Fifty-three paratroopers were 
missing and believed buried in the rubble.”40 
The Marine base bombing was the first instance that a significant number of American 
lives lost due to an act of terrorism inflicted by an Islamic group. It was the highest number of 
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American military personnel killed in a single attack since the Vietnam War.41 There was 
confusion at first on who was responsible for the bom ings with Thomas Friedman announcing 
the group Free Islamic Revolution Movement claiming responsibility. An unidentified American 
traveling with the United States Treasury Secretary in Saudi Arabia at the time was quoted as 
saying it was Amal, a Shiite group that had evolved into a predominantly secular organization.  
The group ultimately found responsible was Islamic Jihad, which was closely linked to and later 
absorbed by Hezbollah. The countries that were attacked, the United States and France who had 
recently soured relations with Iran by selling arms to Iraq, further confirmed the linkage to Iran, 
Friedman argued. 
President Reagan described the act as “despicable.” Aft r meeting with advisors on how 
to best prevent something like this happening again Reagan announced to the American public 
“that we all need to stand up and fight against the boastful nature of those who would assume 
power.” The administration reassured “there would be no change in the United States military 
role in Lebanon.”42 This further reinforced the statement made by former President Carter after 
the protests that occurred after the siege of Mecca, when he stated that the United States cannot 
appear to be retreating in the face of mob violence.43 
The Beirut bombings initially prompted the U.S. and France to declare their resolve to 
maintain their presence as part of an international pe ce keeping mission due to the long running 
civil war that had been ravaging the country. Behind this declared resolve, there were Western 
leaders who began to question the peacekeeping mission. “The heavy loss of life in Lebanon is 
likely to fuel demands by leftist political parties in Italy, France, and Britain for withdrawal of all
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troops from Lebanon.”44 In the United States, The New York Times reported after the bombings 
that “Legislators from both parties said the Reagan administration must redefine and clarify the 
role of marines in Lebanon and their long range mission in the Middle East.” 45Simultaneously 
two reporters arrived in the Levant who would build their reputations by their coverage of the 
conflicts in the Levant. Thomas Friedman arrived in Beirut in June 1979, and Robin Wright had 
already spent time in the country. 
Thomas Friedman is a Jewish American who was born and r ised in the Midwest, but 
spent his high school summers in Israel and later studied Arabic in Cairo. Although he had a deep 
love for studying the Middle East, Friedman would later state he learned early on “a Jew who 
wants to make a career working or studying about the Middle East will always be a lonely man: 
he will never be fully accepted or trusted by the Arabs, and he will never be fully accepted by or 
trusted by the Jews.”46 This allowed Friedman to maintain a degree of neutrality in his coverage 
of the region, especially when stationed in Jerusalem. Since Friedman believed that both sides in 
the conflict were skeptical towards him, this belief allowed Friedman to remain highly critical of 
both sides without worry of losing favor from one or the other.   
The ideological vision of both Wright and Friedman are not only seen in their articles but 
also their titles and subject matters of their initial book publications. Robin Wright’s book 
entitled Sacred Rage focused on the growth of the militant Islamic movement in the Middle East 
while Thomas Friedman’s first book, entitled From Beirut to Jerusalem, covers his experiences 
while living and reporting in the region, his drive to understand the complexities of the conflicts 
he was covering and how these affected the people on the ground. The subjective historical 
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background each offers highlights the first striking feature of their opposing perspectives on how 
to portray the region. 
The history and ideology of the Shi’a is essential to both stories, given that Iran and 
Lebanon are both Shi’a majority countries. Both authors cover the early history of the great 
schism in Islam, but the language is dramatically different in their interpretations. Wright 
mentions the “murder of Ali” and the “killing of Hussein” during the conflict of succession that 
occurred in which the Shi’a split off, believing tha  the Caliphate should remain in the hands of 
the family of the prophet and the Sunnis supporting the idea that Muhammad’s successor should 
be appointed through the process of election by the eld rs of the community. The Shi’a insisted 
that Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet should be the leader of the community. 
Friedman only mentions Ali in his explanation of the schism as the choice of the Shi’a movement 
for the leader, not that he was murdered and that his son Hussein was also killed when he led a 
revolt against the supporters of the Caliphate Muawiy h, who enjoyed larger support in the 
Muslim community.   
The ideology of the Shi’a is also a point of contentio  between the two authors and the 
sources they use to help define what they believe as this ideology. Wright writes that for the 
Shi’a, “every day in his life is a day of battle in which he must seek either triumph or 
martyrdom” quoting Hamid Algar an Islamic expert at Berkeley.  She goes on to quote Professor 
Hasan Askari, a Shi’ite teaching at the Center for the Study of Islam in England. “Shi’ism is all 
about the protest against authority, passion, constant rebellion.”47  Friedman quotes Islamic 
export Edward Mortimer’s book Faith and Power; “The starting point of Shi’ism is defeat: the 
defeat of Ali and his house… Its primary appeal is therefore to the defeated and oppressed. That 
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is why it has been the rallying cry for the underdog in the Muslim world… especially for the 
poor and the dispossessed.” Friedman and Wright use these historical sources on the origins of 
the Shi’a to strengthen their interpretations of how Shi’ism has evolved into a belief that has lent 
itself to such revolutionary ideas and its ability to intertwine modern political ideas with Islamic 
principles on how a nation should be led. 
Wright goes further to establish the violent strain throughout the history of Shi’ism by 
telling the story of Hassan al-Sabbah, a man who’s life history is veiled in mystery, and 
presenting it has historical fact. Sabbah lived in the mountains of what is now Iran and led a 
group of hired killers, whose name or reputation led to the formation of the Assassins. He was a 
convert to the Ismaili sect of Shi’ism. He used religion, along with drugs, to inspire his recruits 
to commit murder, mostly for the prophet and not for ideological or political gains. Wright uses 
this story when discussing Khomeini and the Revoluti nary guards of Iran. Though she says the 
comparisons between the two are minimal at best, the story is used to show the violence she 
believes is inherent in Shi’ism. 
As time moves on Wright and Friedman continue to expand their Middle East 
perspectives. Freidman continues to stay in the region covering the events in Lebanon and 
subsequent peace process in Jerusalem. He worked to maintain a perspective of reporting that 
emphasized the political wants of the region and the ramifications of these actions on 
communities, and tried to de-emphasize the belief of a larger Islamic movement set out to 
reestablish the Caliphate. Even at his most disgusted and angry, when covering relations between 
the Israelis and Palestinians, he stresses the ideologi s of each group not on religious terms but 
on political ones. In an article titled Suicidal Lies in 2002, which discusses the emergence of 
suicide bombings in the Palestinian fight against Israel, he does not once mention Islam, 
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fundamentalism or militancy. He addresses the suicide bombers as Palestinians. The closest he 
treads to the subject of religion is when writing, “The U.S. should make it clear that Arab leaders 
whose media call suicide bombers ‘martyrs’ are not welcome in the U.S.”48 By simplifying 
suicide bombing as a tactic used from one group against nother, he attempts to derail the idea of 
civilizational divides.   
The idea of an organized Islamic fundamentalist movement is investigated more deeply 
in Wright’s book, Sacred Rage. Wright focuses on a meeting in Tehran, in March of 1982, in 
which Islamic extremists across the Muslim world came together to plan a greater Islamic 
Revolution in the Middle East and how to drive outside powers from the region. According to 
Wright this led to militants from around the world f ocking to Iran to join the cause anyway they 
could. Wright further examines the rise of fundamentalism brought up in her book Sacred Rage. 
Though her attack remains focused on Islamic fundamentalism, she also begins to investigate the 
emergence of fundamentalist movements across the glob  and throughout various religions, 
especially those of Hinduism and Judaism. 
 In the documentary based on Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky points out 
the prevalence the New York Times and other major publications in dominating the coverage in 
smaller markets due to the reprinting of the written stories of the larger markets in their own 
newspapers. Friedman was one of the chief correspondents for the New York Times in both Beirut 
and Jerusalem, and Wright was a journalist for the New York Times, and later the Washington 
Post. Both became the voice for their papers, growing from beat writers to editorialists, and, with 
the long arm of these large papers, became prominent narrators in telling the Middle East story 
for moderate in (Friedman) and conservative in (Wright) perspectives. 
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With the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon in the United 
States, the Islamic Republic of Iran was replaced as the fanatical face of Islam by Osama Bin 
Laden, his group al-Qaeda and the ruling Afghanista party, the Taliban, who gave refuge to al-
Qaeda. With the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini andIran’s nuclear program becoming the 
primary focus of hostilities between it and the West, the religious fanaticism image seemed to 
dim especially when compared with the extremism and poor state of human rights in 
Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks caused a significant shif in the official propaganda from the 
conservative Republican Party in America, but furthe  inflamed the religious right of the U.S. 
President George W. Bush, in spite of being a fundamentalist Christian, repeatedly stated that at 
its core Islam was a peaceful religion and most Muslims were a peaceful and positive influence 
on society. This was done in the hopes of assuring alliances with other Islamic countries, and to 
avoid retribution on Muslims and Middle Eastern citizens in the U.S. given the two wars against 
Islamic nations resulting from the events on  9/11. Alternately, in a PBS special on Anti-Islamic 
tendencies in the United States many of the leaders in the U.S. Evangelical movement, in the 
United States, were preaching something decidedly different. The Muslim world could not help 
but believe this was the feeling of the government as well given that both Bush and his Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft were well known evangelicals. The program quotes Reverend Graham 
stating: “The Islamic god is not the same as the Judaic/Christian God, the Islamic god is evil and 
violent god.” Going further it quotes the Rev. Moody Adams who states “killing is against the 
teachings of Christianity, and displeases Jesus and God; in Islam killing pleases Allah.” Moody 
uses passages from the Quran to justify his claims, but only citing the more violent passages and 
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using them out of context.49  Though the piece provides a well balanced account f Evangelical 
leaders being invited to state their opinions on natio l television and the conspicuous absence of 
a defense of Islam, the special somewhat perpetuated the problem by gracing Rev. Moody with 
the segment’s last words. The fundamental Christian groups seemed to adopt as a whole the 
philosophies of Huntington and Lewis. That a Cl sh of Civilizations was at hand, and that 
America needed to be aggressive in the battle against the Islamic world or all will be lost. 
To add to the belief that a larger cultural clash was taking shape the writings of the late 
Sayyid Qutb began to be examined in popular media. “But if one man deserves the title of 
intellectual grandfather to Osama bin Laden and his fellow terrorists, it is probably the Egyptian 
writer and activist Sayyid Qutb who was executed by the Egyptian authorities in the mid-1960's 
for inciting resistance to the regime.”50 
Milestones, one of many books written by  Qutb, calls for an Islamic society based 
strictly on Qur’anic law and the teaching of the Prophet. The torture Qutb endured, and the 
experiences he had in America led him to believe in the closed fist philosophy of creating a pious 
and moral society. Qutb accused not only the West of living in a state of jahiliyyah, an Islamic 
term meaning the ignorance of divine guidance and the time before the revelations of the 
Prophet, but also the supposed Muslim states of the Arab world, and he supported active jihad 
against all jahiliyyah states. In the same New York Times article mentioned above Robert Worth 
quotes an early disciple of Qutb, Fathi Yakan, who r te in the 1960's, ''The groundwork for the 
French Revolution was laid by Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu; the Communist Revolution 
realized plans set by Marx, Engels and Lenin. . . . The same holds true for us as well.'' This 
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groundwork for a revolution based on jihad against all jahiliyyah states would not find an 
audience in the United States until after blood wasspilled on American soil. 
ABC News also produced a special with the aim of informing the American public more 
about Islam. Starting the program with American’s reactions to the word Islam, faces flashed 
across the screen one, describing Islam as “different,” another noting that admitting to being 
Muslim resulted in suspicion of being a terrorist, and a child stating the desire of Muslims 
wanting to build a mosque on the bones of dead Christians, referring to the plans to build an 
Islamic community center near the World Trade Center si . 51 Though the piece’s goal was to 
answer the American people’s questions about Islam, it fell short by not properly identifying 
Islamic extremism as the minute minority of the Islamic faithful. The ABC News special left 
absent the difficult parts of Islam to urge viewers toward a progressive attitude toward Islam, 
much like the focus on Milestones by the conservative media. As the focus in the conservative 
religious community moved towards examining the cultural divide between Western values and 
Islam, there was also an active movement towards trying to inform the American people about 
the history and values of Islam but even with this effort both still painted Islam as the religion of 
the other. 
  




Perspectives of the Muslim Brotherhood from the Beginning of the Revolution, 
Until the election of President Morsi. 
 The Middle East’s history of the last forty years nd the manipulation of that history by 
the media provides an excellent springboard for the application of Chomsky’s theory to analyze 
the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. With the American presidential elections occurring 
simultaneously to the brotherhood’s rise to power, both perspectives began to dominate Western 
media.  Democratic approach, in the media favored th  Whig ideals of stressing diplomacy, 
nation building, economic modernization and global integration, all constructed around a human 
rights/international legal institutional infrastruct re, even if this high ideal is not always held up. 
The more conservative message of stressing security and preemptive action to ensure Western 
interests was adopted by the American Republican Party, which used the chaos and fear brought 
about by the uncertainty of the region to justify their stance and actions they might take. As I will 
show in statements by leaders in both of the dominant American political parties latter in this 
section, the Republican Party argued that President Obama was losing the Middle East to 
extreme Islam and that all U.S. interests in the region would be lost, Israel would be destroyed 
and the American economy would suffer with the loss f vital Middle Eastern oil. The Obama 
democratic campaign argued that democracy was prevailing, that years of oppression were 
collapsing and that America must respect the choice f the Egyptian people and those of other 
states that were finally enjoying the freedom to freely elect their own governments. 
 Egypt, being the most populated nation in the Arab world at over 80 million people, is not 
only one of the chief cultural and political leaders of the region, but also has been a cornerstone 
in U.S. foreign policy in the region and an ally with ts peace treaty with Israel. When the protest 
movement finally achieved their goal of Mubarak being forced from office outside observers 
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became increasingly concerned with the fragility of the treaty, as popular sentiment in the Egypt 
was not in favor of the treaty with Israel. 
 The other chief issue of outside observers and media outlets was the future of Egyptian 
relations with the West in a post Mubarak Egypt. Top among these concerns was the status of the 
Suez Canal, which moves roughly 7% of the world’s commercial naval shipping every year. 52 
Any major disruption or closing of the canal would cause tremendous economic burdens on the 
West and could cause the price of oil to climb dramatically. The uncertainty of the Arab Spring 
led both sides of America’s political spectrum to sound larger drum beats for the reduction in 
foreign energy dependence, but the right kept the redirect of fear and thus intervention also alive 
in their message. 
From the beginning of the protest movement media coverage was favorable to the 
protesters but was hesitant to criticize the long time ally in Mubarak until it was clear he would 
be forced to step down. Headlines such as “Protestors stand fast in Cairo Tahrir Square” and 
“Uprising Energizes Egyptian Women Veiled and Unveiled” appeared in USA Today. The New 
York Times headlines read “Exhilarated by Hope in Cairo” and “Another Day of Demands and 
Defiance” during the early days of the revolution. In the opinion of the White House and even 
the Republican opposition, the perspective on Mubarak was hardly negative and only waned 
when it was clear that his removal was necessary to regain any stability in Egypt. Outwardly, it 
was impossible for either liberals or conservatives to not support the protest movement calling 
for greater democracy. Behind closed doors, however the fear of the Muslim Brotherhood or an 
even more extremist Islamic group caused hesitation in full support of the movement until the 
election of Morsi. 




In the early days of the revolution, the leadership of the Republican and Democratic 
parties made statements supporting the protests and voicing their preference for Egypt to move 
towards a more open and democratic state. Echoing U.S. media coverage, there was also a 
measure of support for Mubarak, who had long been an U.S. ally. President Obama, in an 
interview with Bill O’Reilly on February 6, 2011, stated, “The Egyptian people want freedom, 
they want free and fair elections, they want a representative government.” On the subject of 
Mubarak he stated, “that he has been a good partner when it comes to peace with Israel, and 
there have been counterterrorism efforts that he has been supportive of.” 53 Obama never stated 
in the interview that he felt Mubarak should step down, and went so far to praise Mubarak’s 
knowledge of many aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the region. This, among other reasons, 
could be a reason why the president was leery of asking Mubarak to resign, even with the cries 
for democracy that the U.S. supposedly champions. 
The eventual Republican nominee for president, MittRomney, stated in an interview on 
the television show The View on February 1, 2011, that Mubarak was a long standing friend to 
the U.S. but called for democratic reforms. Romney’s closest advisor on foreign affairs, 
especially dealing with the Middle East, was Dan Seor, who was the former chief spokesman 
for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and also a regular contributor to the Wall Street 
Journal and Fox News.54 He ended his statements on Egypt saying, “We must not allow Egypt to 
transform into an Islamic government.”55 This sentiment was echoed in an article from the 
conservative leaning newspaper,  The Washington Times which stated,”  The U.S. government 
has a vital role helping Middle Eastern states transits from tyranny to political participation 
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without Islamists hijacking the process. George W. Bush had the right idea in 2003 in calling for 
democracy but he ruined this effort by demanding insta t results. Barack Obama initially 
reverted to the failed old policy of making nice with tyrants; now he is myopically siding with 
the Islamists against Mr. Mubarak.”56 These thinly veiled calls for U.S. intervention if events did 
not transpire according to Western interests are contrasted by President Obama’s position in the 
same interview with Bill O’Reilly the President states, “Ultimately the United States cannot 
absolutely dictate” when asked when questioned overwh n Mubarak should step down, but this 
policy was also applied to all events concerning the revolution. 
When the protesting persisted and it became clear that Mubarak’s long 30-year reign was 
near collapse, the speculation of what was next for Egypt began to dominate the coverage in the 
West. This speculation quickly gravitated towards the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest, best 
organized and largest opposition group in Egypt. At firs  choosing not to participate in the 
elections, chiefly due to the largely violent and oppressive retribution inflicted upon them in the 
past by the state, the Brotherhood’s involvement and support began to grow as the momentum of 
the protest movement grew. With this further involvement in the revolution so came a flood of 
coverage focused on the Brotherhood, and headlines contemplating a sequel of the Iranian 
revolution. 
Starting on February 1st 2011, popular ultra-conservative media personality Glenn Beck 
began a weeklong examination of the Muslim Brotherhood, which rarely stayed focused on the 
main topic.  Three main themes carried throughout the televised piece; the establishment of a 
Caliphate, Western leftist socialist connections to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, which he 
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believed were one in the same and not that Hamas is an offspring with no official connection, 
and lastly the hatred of Israel and desire to “kill all the Jews.”57 
The idea of the Caliphate brought up by Beck is fear mongering at its finest. He goes on 
to explain just how it would all come about. With Iran and Somalia already “in the green”, a term 
for states becoming radically Islamic, he listed other Arab states that could tip towards the green. 
He then claimed that if Morocco became an extreme Islamic state, their influence would spread 
to Spain, which, he reminds the viewers, used to be under Islamic control, neglecting to mention 
that it was over 500 years ago, with the conversion of Spain the Strait of Gibraltar would be cut 
off from the West, with the ominous results of the loss a valuable marine passage for oil and 
opening of a religious corridor for Islam into Europe. He also added that if the Brotherhood 
ascended to power the Suez Canal would also be closd t  Western states and thus both maritime 
entrances to the Mediterranean Sea would be under the control of the Caliphate. The propagation 
of fear concerning extreme Islam controlling the Middle East is further addressed in the 
Washington Times article previously mentioned which states, “Three d cades had to go by, it 
appears, before the self-immolation of a vendor in an obscure Tunisia town could light the 
conflagration that Khomeini aspired to, and Iranian authorities still seek.”58 All these concerns 
revolve around the costs of oil and the Western economic disaster that would? Should its 
transportation fall under the control of the Caliphate, another example of using fear to justify 
action in favor of Western interests. These themes echo those of Robin Wright, arguing the 
Islamic conspiracy to control the Middle East, and Lewis and Huntington years earlier arguing 
that the cultural conflict was only in a matter of time. 
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Paul Gigot, the editorial page editor for the Wall Street Journal, conducted an interview 
session with Fouad Ajami, the director of the Middle East Studies Program Advanced 
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and later with Wall Street Journal editorial 
board member Matt Kaminski on February 7, 2011. In keeping with the gentle criticism of 
Mubarak from both the left and the right, Kaminski called for Mubarak to step down to help 
appease the rising tide of protest in Egypt but neglected to mention the atrocities for which 
Mubarak was being protested. Kaminski’s evaluation of Mubarak was “He gave Egypt, I would 
maintain, 12 good years. He began well. He was a modest man. He kept the peace with Israel. He 
tried, if you will, to diffuse the tensions in Egyptian society that the Sadat diplomacy and the 
Sadat style had triggered.”59 What qualifies twelve years of Mubarak’s 30-year reign as “good” 
remains a mystery and the interview proceeds without any mention of the complaints against 
Mubarak that caused the revolution to start such as a f iled economic plan, a near twenty-year 
constant police state and a failure to provide support in times of crisis to name just a few. Gigot 
went on to ask if elections in Egypt should be put off so as to give time to the secular movement, 
which was largely responsible for the Revolution, time to organize into viable political parties in 
order to compete with the more organized Muslim Brotherhood and former members of 
Mubarak’s regime. Kaminski’s response was “I think we've sort of learned a lot in the last 30 
years of this global wave of democracy of what works, what doesn't work. The reason why it 
didn't work in Gaza with Hamas, and in Lebanon with Hezbollah, is because those parties did not 
believe in the legitimacy of a democratic system. They have armed militias. They want to bring 
down democracy. So whatever we put in place, we sort of need proper checks and balances, rule 
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of law, to ensure that the first election is not the last election.” Gigot, “But are you saying that 
antidemocratic forces should be banned from democratic elections?” Kaminski, “I think they 
have to sort of--it has to be done through a legal and orderly process.”60 Clearly, again this is a 
case of implying that Western ideals need to be met in order for a satisfactory outcome. Under 
the power of the all-powerful presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and lastly Mubarak, it is difficult to 
determine if their growing democratic sentiments would be put into reality. Also the speculation 
highlights an ignorance of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas but, one doesn’t 
have to look far to see the distinctions between th Brotherhood and other militant Islamic 
groups that have achieved a degree of legitimate power, most notably the Brotherhoods declared 
commitment in the early 1970’s to precede with a non–violent path towards the achievement of 
their goals. 
Although Hamas was born out of the Brotherhood, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
had long disavowed violence, and had become an active proponent of democracy in Egypt. 
Throughout the Glenn Beck sessions the destruction of Israel was a recurring theme. Walter 
Mead, in his article discussing American Christian views towards the establishment of a Jewish 
state throughout U.S. history gives us the reasoning behind conservative Christian support of 
Israel. Since 1967 the United States has been experi ncing a religious revival in many parts of 
the country, and Episcopal and evangelical faiths experienced the greatest increase in followers 
and these faiths believed in strict interpretations f the Bible and the prophesies held within the 
scriptures. These strict interpretations made them, according to Mead, prophetic Zionists, 
believing that the only way for Armageddon, or Judgment day, to begin was for the Jews to 
regain power in Israel and to rebuild Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem. This belief along with the 
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growing dislike of the Arab world due to their on again off again connections to the Soviet 
Union, has lead to the enthusiastic support of the C ristian right towards the Israeli cause.61  The 
violence committed by Hamas has been looked down upo  by the Brotherhood, and since 
Morsi’s election in 2012 Egypt has been the key broke  in relations between Hamas and the West 
in an effort to end conflicts between Hamas and Israel. Mr. Beck erroneously lumps the two 
entities by referring to them singularly as, “Hamas, l o known as the Muslim Brotherhood.” 
The link between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood is undeniable, with Hamas originating 
from the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. While Hamas receives aid from the 
Brotherhood, it is to continue its charitable organiz tions, which total about 90% of Hamas’ $70 
million annual budget62. Beck inappropriately links a recognized terrorist group with an 
organization that has publicly distanced itself from violence for over 40 years. Adopting the 
conservative philosophy of interpreting the facts on hand, he avoids discussing why the Muslim 
world has come to dislike Israel and robs conservative Americans of a truer understanding of the 
situation.  
In a call and response, The Daily Beast and the Council of Foreign Relations published 
articles both attacking the Muslim Brotherhood in the former and defending in the latter within 
months of each other. Leslie Gelb, who was a long time reporter for the New York Times, a 
consistent supporter of the Israeli state and currently holds the title of President Emeritus of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, in his article for The Daily Beast makes broad stroke claims 
against the Brotherhood with little evidence. In statements to further perpetrate fear of the 
Brotherhood coming to power he writes, “The Muslim Brotherhood gaining control would be 
calamitous for U.S. security” and, “If the Muslim Brotherhood gains control, it’s going to be 
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almost impossible to take back control, just look at Ir n.”63 Since the advent of the Egyptian 
revolution, began the comparisons to the Iranian Revolution were numerous,this is despite many 
writings by leading experts on the Middle East, such as Juan Cole, dispelling any belief that 
Egypt could end up like a situation in Iran. In hisarticle Why Egypt 2011 is not Iran 1979, Cole 
takes a point by point of analysis of how the Iranian revolution came about and then uses those 
points to illustrate how the situation was not the same in Egypt. 
Fear was further propagated in British papers like Th Daily Telegraph, which ran an 
article entitled 14-year-old girl beaten to death in the name of Shari’a. Could this be what’s in 
store for Egypt?  In this article the author, Toby Young, makes outlandish claims connecting the 
Muslim Brotherhood to the Nazis in the 1930’s and 1940’s and that the Brotherhood would be 
enacting an interpretation of Shari’a comparable to that of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi 
Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban. 
In the answer to Leslie Gelb’s article, the Council on Foreign Relations released two 
articles: Islam and Politics in Egypt an interview with Dina Shehata, Senior Researcher, Al 
Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and No Need to Fear the Rise of the 
Brotherhood by Ed Husain. Both of these articles work to dispel many of the fears of what might 
ultimately happen when and if the Muslim Brotherhood, through their Freedom and Justice party, 
gained control of power in Egypt. Trying to soften the blow of what the ramifications of an 
Islamist party gaining control in Egypt, Shehata informs the reader that Shari’a law is already 
present in Egyptian law as careful balance of civil and Shari’a law had been in place for much of 
the history of the Egyptian Republic. The piece also goes on to point out the lack of a powerful 
clerical establishment in Egypt, thus lessening the chance of Egypt adopting the Iranian style 
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government, and another issue that is not widely know i  the West. Lastly Shehata points to 
those who might disagree with her opinions stating, “American analysts make broad statements 
about Islamists without making distinctions between who they are addressing.” 64 By educating 
the masses on what moderate political Islam is compared to radical Islamic political beliefs, 
those who choose to make these broad statements would lose the fear of the other that has been 
pushed for so long. 
Ed Husain elaborates further in his article to calm fears of a Brotherhood run Egypt. On 
the fears of Egypt harboring terrorism “They are far removed from al-Qaeda and the supporters 
of violent jihad.”65 This statement is supported by highly critical comments against the Muslim 
Brotherhood by the top deputy to Osama bin Laden and former member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Ayman al-Zawahiri, for participating in the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary 
elections.66 In an attempt to dispel the idea that Egypt will close relations or become overly 
hostile towards the West, Husain points out “members of the Freedom and Justice party, the 
Brotherhood’s party, tell me they cannot make Egypt more prosperous without Western help and 
guidance.”67 
CAIRO — Egypt’s military rulers on Sunday officially recognized Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the winner of Egypt’s first competitive presidential election, handing the 
Islamists both a symbolic triumph and a potent weapon in their struggle for power against the 
country’s top generals. 
After the election of Mohammad Morsi, outcries for who was responsible for losing 
Egypt, with American Presidential nominee, Mitt Romney accusing Obama on numerous 
occasions of losing Egypt to Islamists. Romney ignored or failed to mention in his accusations 
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that even the most conservative of Middle East experts acknowledged that there was nothing the 
U.S. could do directly to determine who would end up in charge of long time ally. The journal of 
the American conservative think tank, Middle East Forum, Middle East Quarterly released an 
article the day before Morsi was sworn in warning of what was in store. The article saw the 
military sharing power with Morsi with the former controlling foreign policy and the latter 
controlling internal matters. “In fact, one could well see the military adopt an approach toward 
militancy not dissimilar to the methods of the Pakistani security forces.”68 With the constant 
tension the U.S. finds itself in with Pakistan, predominantly due to militancy active in the 
Pakistani military, fears the same situation would emerge in an Islamic controlled Egypt, and 
further adding to the perceived terrorist threat to the West. Al-Tamim finishes his article 
contemplating the long-term ramifications of the Morsi election stating, “In the long run, chaos 
and instability are most likely to dominate the country's future.” 
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Conclusion 
Beginning with British occupation in 1882, the Egyptian people have been fighting 
against occupation and oppression, with the first glimmer of success coming after the Revolution 
of 1919 against the British. The result of this altercation with the British resulted in “official” 
recognition of Egyptian sovereignty by the British, but in actuality the British still dominated 
Egyptian affairs and occupied portions of the country essential to their own interests such as the 
Suez region.  
 Not until the Free Officers movement masterminded an carried out the 1952 Revolution 
that Egypt was able to throw off occupation and enjoy self-rule. With the rise to power of 
General Gamal Nasser from the Free Officers movement, so began the over sixty year rule of 
three presidents who would use any means to maintain the power they had achieved.  Nasser was 
the first of this line of dominant presidents and Anwar Sadat succeeded him and lastly Hosni 
Mubarak succeeded Sadat and ruled for the longest period of the three rulers for over thirty 
years.  The tight control of power by these three leaders insured that the Egyptian people 
remained oppressed long after the colonial powers had relinquished control. 
 In January 2011, sparked by an uprising in Tunisia, the Egyptian people began their own 
mass protests against the tyrannical rule of Mubarak. The protesters at first only called for 
greater representation in government and an end to the repressive police state status that had 
been in effect since 1967. After Mubarak resorted to the familiar brutal tactics in order to quell 
the uprising, the movement transformed into an all out revolution against his rule. No longer 
could Mubarak hide his cruel means of maintaining power and it was no longer easy for the 
democratic nations of the West, like the United States, to maintain support for the Egyptian 
regime.   
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 On February 11, 2011 Mubarak finally succumbed to the protestors and resigned, handing 
power over to the Supreme Military Council, which assured the people of Egypt it would only 
maintain control until free and fair elections could be safely held. As the Military Council began 
to assure their power was maintained after a new government was set up, and at the same time 
postponing elections reasoning that more time was needed for the secular parties of the protest 
movement to organize and galvanize support more uprisings began to spring up against this 
blatant power grab.  When pressure finally forced the Military Council to speed up the electoral 
process there were only two parties that were able to mount national campaigns for the 
parliament and presidential elections; the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the party representing the previous regime. The Fre dom and Justice party dominated the 
parliamentary elections, and as far as the presidency, after a first round of elections only two 
candidates remained, Mohammad Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party and Ahmed Shafik, the 
last Prime Minister under Mubarak. With only these two options to choose from there was only 
one choice to make for the supporters of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood who had long 
been in opposition to the occupation of Egypt and later the oppression put upon its people by the 
Egyptian state was ushered into power. 
 Since the election, Morsi has faced many issues such as extremist attacks in the Sinai 
Peninsula, fighting between Israel and Hamas, trying to form a coalition government and 
constructing a constitution. Morsi was instrumental in acting as the go between the United States 
and Israel and Hamas helping put an end to the confli t i  a timely fashion. In forming a 
government that represents all Egyptians and helping shape a constitution that insures the rights 
of all are represented he has fallen back on the tactics of his predecessors. Filling the ranks of the 
top offices with members of his party and the Brotherhood Morsi has not given a voice in the 
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highest ranks of the government to the minorities like he had sworn during the elections. When 
pushing forth the constitution that was drafted primarily by members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and contained provisions that further entwined Egyptian law with Islamic 
principals President Morsi successfully enacted a power play that allowed him to over rule the 
court systems and other hurdles that stood in the way of implementing the new constitution. 
 The process towards democratization is a hurdle that might ultimately derail the Muslim 
Brotherhoods newfound position of power in Egypt. Democratic institutions need time to 
develop and take root in a society’s mindset and expectations. Full representation of all aspects 
of society need to be in positions of power in order to construct a truly democratic system and 
ensure the peaceful passing of leadership from leader to leader. Underrepresentation of any group 
could lead to unrest and ultimately lead the forcible removing of power as in what occurred to 
Mubarak and ultimately ushered Morsi into the presid ncy.  
“It is not hard to fathom why the fundamentalist label has gained such wide currency. For 
conservatives, the term is associated with xenophobia, militancy and radicalism. For 
Liberals, it means extremism, fanaticism, and tradiionalism. For radicals it evokes 
theological obscurantism, political activism, and the rejection of science, history, 
modernity, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. For the Orientalists, the 
term is useful precisely because it implies that the Muslim world is intrinsically timeless, 
unchanging, Irrational, backward looking, and programmed merely to replay old scripts 
from the time Prophet, the early caliphate, and the medieval Crusades”69 
The answer to the question presented to me in Tahrir Square of how the American people 
will react to the election of Morsi and rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood is still a 
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complicated one that is difficult to answer. There a years of events that have clouded our 
perceptions of current events in the Middle East. These events unfold far from the United States 
and we are forced to learn of them through our choice f various mass media outlets, outlets that 
are heavily influenced by the many massive corporations that either own these media outlets or 
finance them with advertising dollars. Higher academic institutes or think tanks like the more 
diplomatic Council on Foreign Relations and the more conservative Middle East Forum also 
have a heavy influence on these various media outlets. And lastly, the government pushes its 
message using its influence on all of these organizations. 
We have seen that the diplomatic perspective has tried to limit the scope of Islamism in 
the Middle East, preferring to address things in a case by case, state by state instance. When 
Islamism derails progress, it is not a grand conspiracy for an Islamic Empire and more nationalist 
movements using Islam to galvanize support for their cause. Examples of this are Friedman’s 
article on suicide bombings in the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict, or Juan Cole explaining how 
events that led to the Iranian Revolution had no resemblance to events of the Egyptian 
Revolution, and the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The conservative perspective on 
the other hand perceives Khomeini’s grand plan as still very much alive. A plan, that if given the 
opportunity, would transform the Middle East into an Islamic Caliphate that has aims to destroy 
the West and set back any human rights gains that we enjoy. And examples of this are in former 
republican nominee for president, Mitt Romney’s comments questioning how we “lost” Egypt to 
an Islamic fundamentalist group. This echoed statements after the fall of the Shah in Iran and the 
subsequent seizure of power by Khomeini. 
When dealing with the West there is a similar motivation by both sides. The withholding 
of facts is ever present in both arguments and the negative tone is also apparent, whether it is a 
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flicker or a flame. Covering up the past, which influences the present, is a prime motivator as is 
justifying the support of tyrants for the past fifty years. Both of these motivators weigh on both 
parties of the United States, and both need to maintain a presence in the region. One side uses 
fear to justify action and the other uses cautious optimism that needs Western aid to foster 
progress.  
Although the Internet has made access to knowledge asier for the average person, it is 
still difficult to investigate the whole truth on ay given topic such as issues involving the 
Middle East. The average individual does not have the time and means to compile the vast 
amount of information and use this information to pressure their local media, let alone the larger 
media outlets.  
While ideally the mass media outlets would not shirk their responsibility to accurately 
inform the population instead of catering to their co porate and government interests, it falls on 
intellectuals and independent media outlets to compile and present data to an open and willing 
public at large, a public who not only wants to change the way the mass media distributes 
information but longs to use objective information t  draw their own conclusions about the world 
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